Fordham International Law Journal
Volume 40, Issue 5

2017

Article 3

The UK and EU Cross-Border Insolvency
Recognition: From Empire to Europe to
“Going It Alone”
Susan Block-Lieb∗

∗

Copyright c 2017 by the authors. Fordham International Law Journal is produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press (bepress). http://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/ilj

ARTICLE
THE UK AND EU CROSS-BORDER INSOLVENCY
RECOGNITION: FROM EMPIRE TO EUROPE TO
“GOING IT ALONE”
Susan Block-Lieb*

I. INTRODUCTION ........................................................................1374
II. THREE DRAFT CONVENTIONS AND A REGULATION ....1376
A. The EEC Draft Convention ..............................................1378
B. The Istanbul Convention ...................................................1382
C. The (Third Draft) European Convention on Insolvency
Proceedings .....................................................................1386
D. The (Original) EU Regulation on Cross-Border
Insolvency .......................................................................1391
E. British Influence on the EU Regulation on CrossBorder Insolvency ...........................................................1393
III. BRITISH IMPLEMENTATION OF THE EU
INSOLVENCY REGULATION ...........................................1394
A. COMI and the Possibility That Presumptions Get
Rebutted ..........................................................................1395
B. Protecting Local Creditors Without Opening Secondary
Proceedings? ...................................................................1400
IV. REVISING THE EU INSOLVENCY REG, WHILE
MOVING TOWARD CONVERGENCE .............................1402
A. [Revised] EU Regulation 2015/848 on insolvency
proceedings .....................................................................1405
* Cooper Family Professor in Urban Legal Issues. Many thanks to my colleagues Martin
Gelter, Roger Goebel, Mark Patterson, and all the members of the Fordham International Law
Journal, for their help in putting on this timely and important symposium. Thanks are also due
to Xun Chen (Fordham J.D. 2018) and Adam R. Cohen (Fordham J.D. 2018) for their brilliant
research assistance, and my librarian, Alison Shea, for all her help in locating numerous
sources.

1373

1374 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 40:5

B. Proposed EU Directive on preventative restructuring
frameworks ......................................................................1406
V. THE EFFECTS OF BREXIT ON EUROPEAN
INSOLVENCY PRACTICES ...............................................1407
VI. CONCLUSION..........................................................................1412
I. INTRODUCTION
The conclusion of the EU Insolvency Regulation,1 after
negotiations on earlier versions had languished for nearly forty years,
has been described as “one of the finest achievements of European
jurisprudence.”2 The success of the recent referendum in the United
Kingdom to exit the European Union (Brexit)3 puts this important law
at risk. That the United Kingdom initially declined to sign on to a
draft convention on which the original EU Insolvency Reg was based
might raise questions as to whether preservation of this Reg is
consistent with British interests going forward.4 But the loss of
Community-wide agreement on the recognition and treatment of
insolvency proceedings would be a great tragedy, and not just a
European tragedy. The loss of the EU Insolvency Reg would hurt the
United Kingdom, as well.
This paper argues both that retention of the EU Insolvency Reg
would strongly benefit the interests of the United Kingdom, and that
1. See generally Council Regulation 1346/2000/EC on insolvency proceedings, 2000
O.J. L 160/1, art. 46, at 160/13 [hereinafter EU Insolvency Reg or EU Reg, as clarity permits].
2. Personal correspondence with Philip Wood (on file with the editors of the Fordham
International Law Journal).
3. Brexit is a snappy moniker, but really it is the United Kingdom and not just Great
Britain that is a member of the European Union; the difference between the two involves
Northern Ireland, whose interests in the issue of “UKexit” might well be different from that of
the interests of Great Britain on Brexit. This paper nonetheless ignores the distinct issues
raised by Northern Ireland. It also (perhaps confusingly) uses the terms British as an adjective
referring to the United Kingdom, with apologies to Northern Ireland.
4. Although Brexit has been described as motivated mostly by fears that immigrants
and asylum seeking were crowding Britain and that the UK’s continued membership in the
European Union would preclude it from cutting back on free mobility of entry to the United
Kingdom, issues distinct from those involved in the EU Insolvency Reg, the Brexit vote might
also be characterized as a referendum on free trade within Europe, as well as on dissatisfaction
over-intrusive regulatory instincts emanating out of Brussels. Many are hoping out loud for a
“soft” Brexit, especially on issues of trade and regulation, but the outcome of these
negotiations remain unclear. See Financial Times, Mehreen Khan, What Next for Brexit? UK
election throws uncertainty on Tory EU exit plans (June 8, 2017), available at
https://www.ft.com/content/20ddec22-eed6-3c46-9989-85e735c68213. .
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its retention or replication will be exceedingly difficult to achieve. In
building the case that the EU Reg serves important British interests, I
retell the chronology of its adoption. The story of British accession to
the terms of the original EU Insolvency Regulation is complicated by
the fact that the terms of the EU Reg are the product of negotiations
on three earlier draft conventions on the same topic. The story of
British implementation of the original EU Reg is further complicated
and perhaps clarified by its denouement: this regulation included an
obligation to study the effects of its implementation ten years after its
entry into force and possibly to revise its terms after reflection on this
study;5 as a result, the original EU Reg has recently been revised by
the EU Parliament.6 British fingerprints on the contents of these
revisions suggest that the United Kingdom should try, to the greatest
extent possible, to remain committed to the core principles set out in
the revised EU Insolvency Regulation.7 But it will be difficult for the
United Kingdom to accomplish the core benefits of this Regulation –
automatic recognition and enforcement across Europe – after Brexit
and when going it alone. Cross-border recognition is possibly
meaningless in the absence of enforcement, and enforcement sits in
tension with complete “independence” from the European Union.
In the text that follows, Part I describes negotiations over what
subsequently became the original EU Insolvency Regulation. There
are four subparts to this section because the EU Reg was adopted after
three earlier tries to draft and implement a European-wide convention
on the same topic. To supplement secondary literature, since little of
this focuses explicitly on British involvement in the making of this
regulation, I draw on reports from various British government and
private actors analyzing whether accession to a cross-border
insolvency convention or regulation was consistent with British
interests. These reports highlight distinctly British concerns that were
not always telegraphed in the secondary literature commenting on
5. See EU Reg, supra note 1, art. 46, at 160/13.
6. See generally European Parliament and Council Regulation 2015/848/EU on
insolvency proceedings, 2015 O.J. L 141/19 [hereinafter “revised EU Insolvency Reg”]. The
effective date on this revision had been delay to Jun 30, 2017, see id. art. 84, at 56, but the
revised EU Insolvency Reg has now entered into effect throughout the European Union,
including the United Kingdom. See infra Parts IV and V.
7. But there is a big difference between a regulation that binds all multilateral signators,
and unilateral domestic legislation that looks to copy its terms. For discussion of the pros and
cons of such “me-too” domestic legislation, see generally John F. Coyle, Incorporative
Statutes and the Borrowed Treaty Rule, 50 VA. J. INT’L L. 655 (2010).
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these drafts, including that written by British academics and
practitioners. Part II considers the decisions of British courts when
asked to implement the original EU Insolvency Regulation. Perhaps
surprisingly, this case law shows that, from the moment the EU Reg
entered into effect, British insolvency practitioners argued and courts
agreed that the EU Reg allowed coordination of insolvency
proceedings in ways that, before accession to the Reg, had been
described as prohibited and thus a shortcoming of that regulation.
British courts succeeded, in other words, in interpreting the EU Reg
to resolve concerns that had been raised before accession and, with
this construction, to further British interests. Next, Part III traces the
influence of this British case law and insolvency practice on recent
revision to the EU Insolvency Reg.8 It finds that the practical victories
that had been achieved in British courts were successfully touted
within the European Commission and later the European Parliament
as time-tested and ready for implementation across the Continent.
British implementation of the original EU Insolvency Reg got
“codified” in the revised EU Reg. Part IV reflects on the implications
of this experience for European cross-border insolvency practices
post-Brexit.
II. THREE DRAFT CONVENTIONS AND A REGULATION
Unified economic markets require coordination and mutual
recognition of judgments. In the absence of coordination of
recognition and enforcement of judicial proceedings, commercial
actors face enormous uncertainty, potentially undermining otherwise
unfettered trade in markets. The Treaty of Rome, which first mapped
out the contours of the project of creating a united European
Community, commits member states to negotiate a range of
conventions for the benefit of their nationals, including one to secure
“the simplification of formalities of governing the reciprocal
recognition and enforcement of judgments of court or tribunals . . .
.”9

8. Article 46 of the original EU Reg stipulated that the Commission should review
practices under the regulation and propose needed revisions beginning in 2012. See EU Reg,
supra note 1.
9. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, art. 220,
298 U.N.T.S. 11 [hereinafter Treaty of Rome]. For the complete text of the Treaty of Rome,
see Treaties and international agreements registered or filed and recorded with the Secretariat
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Private international law conventions (PIL conventions),10
although governing only procedural topics, are not apolitical;11
international agreement within Europe on matters of jurisdiction,
choice of law and the recognition and enforcement of judgments
required concessions of sovereignty no less significant than with
international agreement on issues of legal substance. The 1968
Brussels Convention concerning Judicial Competence and the
Execution of Decisions in Civil and Commercial Matters took ten
years to negotiate; in order to reach agreement in this relatively short
period of time (at least short in terms of the time taken to negotiate
PIL conventions),12 negotiators carved out several difficult issues for
subsequent resolution. As with other PIL conventions, the Brussels
Convention excludes bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings from its

of the United Nations, Vol. 298, I. No. 4302 (1958), available at https://treaties.un.org/doc/
publication/unts/volume%20298/v298.pdf.
10. PIL conventions regulate private relationships across national borders, and nearly
uniformly are limited to procedural topics, such as jurisdiction, applicable law and the
recognition and enforcement of judgments.
11. See generally HAROLD C. GUTTERIDGE, THE CODIFICATION OF PRIVATE
INTERNATIONAL LAW (1951).
12. The first four Hague Conferences on Private International Law (1893, 1894, 1900,
1904) resulted in six treaties dealing with civil procedure (1896), the conclusion of marriages
(1900), choice of law and jurisdiction in matters of divorce and judicial separation (1900),
guardianship of minors (1900), the personal and proprietary relationships between spouses
(1904), and compulsory guardianship of adults (1904). From 1904 to 1925, the work on
private international law was on a halt, and between 1925 to the end of the Second World War,
discussions and debates resulted only in a protocol accepting the jurisdiction of the
International Court of Justice for the interpretation of the Hague Conventions. It was only after
1951 that conventions on procedure, family matters, succession, commercial matters, torts, and
conflict of laws were regularly negotiated and went into force. See generally Kurt Lipstein,
One Hundred Years of Hague Conferences on Private International Law, 42 INT’L & COMP. L.
Q. 553 (1993). Despite working for years, the Hague Conference has not completed its draft
PIL convention on the recognition and enforcement of civil and commercial law matters,
although it continues working on this project. See Working Group on the Judgments Project,
Proposed Draft Text on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments, Prel. Doc.
No. 1 (Apr. 2016), available at https://assets.hcch.net/docs/01adb7d9-13f3-4199-b1d3ca62de79360f.pdf.
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scope.13 The EU Insolvency Regulation is thus understood to fill in
gaps intentionally set out in the Brussels Convention.14
European negotiations on filling in the gap left by the
bankruptcy carve-out in the Brussels Convention would span more
than thirty years after completion of the general convention on
enforcement of judgments. There were at least three different
European bankruptcy conventions drafted to remedy this hole before
the European Union settled finally on the EU Insolvency Regulation.
The following sections detail all four stages, focusing specifically on
British involvement in those negotiations and British reaction to the
drafts.
A. The EEC Draft Convention
By 1960, even before negotiations on the Brussels Convention
were completed, work on a draft European convention on crossborder insolvency procedures had begun. But this quick start on
negotiations did not produce quick resolution. Negotiations within the
European Economic Community (EEC) Commission did not produce
a preliminary draft until 1970,15 although during that period the EEC
included only six member states and did not include the United
Kingdom.16
When the United Kingdom (and Ireland and Denmark) later
joined the EEC in 1973, they agreed in principle to accede to
conventions that already had been agreed to by the original six
13. See generally Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in
Civil and Commercial Matters, Sept. 27, 1968, art. 1(2), 1262 U.N.T.S. 153, as amended by
various Accession Conventions [hereinafter Brussels Convention] (expressly declaring that the
Convention shall not apply to “bankruptcy, proceedings relating to the winding up of insolvent
companies or other legal persons, judicial arrangements, compositions and analogous
proceedings”).
14. See Hamed Alavi and Tatsiana Khamionchonak, A Step Forward In The
Harmonization Of European Jurisdiction: Regulation Brussels I Recast, 8 BALTIC J. L. & POL.
161, 169 (2015)(discussing relationship between Brussels Convention, including Brussels
Regulation I and II, and EU Insolvency Regulation).
15. See generally Commission of the European Communities, Directorate-General for
the Internal Market and Approximation of Legislation, Report on the Convention Relating to
Bankruptcies, Compositions and Analogous Procedures, 16.775/XIV/70-E (1970) (written by
Jean Noel, Conseiller a la Cour, and Jacques Lemontey, Magistrat au Minstere de la Justice,
France) [hereinafter Noel-Lemontey Report].
16. French Prime Minister de Gaulle blocked UK membership twice in the 1960s.
Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom joined the EEC in 1973 after Charles De Gaulle’s
resignation in 1969.
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member states,17 and to become immediately involved in negotiations
on draft conventions.18 The British government quickly sought expert
advice on the preliminary draft convention on bankruptcy.19 The
Secretary of State for Trade created a six-person committee to review
the preliminary draft convention, and appointed Lord Kenneth Cork
as chairman of this committee. In its 1976 report, the Advisory
Committee advised Parliament that, on the whole, the preliminary
draft convention was “of real value.”20 As a result, the United
Kingdom quickly joined in negotiations that produced a revised draft
in 1980, and additional revisions in 1982 and 1984 (together the EEC
Draft).21 Despite more than a dozen years of work, by the time of this
last revision it was clear that there was insufficient support and the
EEC Draft was scrapped before seeking the signature of member
states.22
The EEC Draft was abandoned because many – both inside the
United Kingdom and on the Continent – thought it was too ambitious
and unrealistic in its goals. The Draft sought guarantees of both
universality (that is, agreement that bankruptcies within Europe
would be mutually recognized by all member states) and of unity (that
is, agreement that a bankruptcy opened in one member state would
bar all other member states from opening another proceeding); it also
17. See Kurt H. Nadelmann, A Reflection on Bankruptcy Jurisdiction: News from the
European Common Market, the United States and Canada, 27 REV. DE DROIT MCGILL 541,
542 (1982) (referring specifically to the Brussels Convention).
18. Id. (discussing involvement in negotiations on the 1970 preliminary draft
convention on bankruptcy).
19. See generally Report of the Advisory Committee, The EEC Preliminary Draft
Convention on Bankruptcy, Winding-Up, Arrangements, Compositions, and Similar
Proceedings, Presented to Parliament by the Secy of State for Trade by Command of Her
Majesty, Cmnd. 6602 (August 1976) [hereinafter Cork Report].
20. Id. at 101, ¶ 411. The Cork Report did not view the preliminary EEC Draft as
perfect. Id. at 100-03, ¶¶ 407-21. The Advisory Committee had collected comments from
numerous professionals and professional associations and remarked on the specifics of some of
this commentary, many of which were negative. Id. at 101-03, ¶¶ 412-21. Further, one member
of the Advisory Committee wrote separately in the Cork Report to express his disagreement
with the indirect jurisdictional provisions in the Draft. Id. at 105-28 (Note of reservation by
Mr. A.E. Anton).
21. Nadelmann notes that criticisms to the preliminary draft found in a Note of
Reservation to the Cork Report led directly to changes in the 1982 and 1984 versions of the
EEC Draft. See Nadelmann, supra note 17, at 543.
22. See, e.g., Manfred Balz, The European Union Convention on Insolvency
Proceedings, 70 AM. BANKR. L. J. 485, 490-92 (1996) (describing history of EEC Draft). See
also Ian F. Fletcher, International Insolvency: A Case for Study and Treatment, 27 INT’L LAW.
429, 437 (1993) (also describing history of EEC Draft).
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sought harmonization of substantive aspects of bankruptcy law.23
Each of these attributes of the EEC Draft was highly controversial
given broad divergence at the time in the bankruptcy and insolvency
laws of member states.24 Distinct insolvency laws were not the only
hurdle to adoption of the EEC Draft. European laws on the treatment
of secured and priority creditors were also in conflict,25 which meant
that the unity sought to be achieved through the EEC Draft might
easily result in economic loss for “local” creditors situated in member
states outside the state in which the “universal” proceeding was first
commenced. The Draft came under heavy attack from practitioners
and quickly died of its own weight.26
Although the criticism of the EEC Draft that ultimately sank it
was the complaint that it tried to do too much, there was also a
realization within the British government that the Draft did not look
to do enough.27 Insolvent insurance companies and other financial
service industries sat outside its scope; the Draft also did not address
the financial problems of multinational corporate groups. It was silent
on the treatment of insolvency proceedings that straddled European
member states and “third countries” situated outside Europe, like the
United States but also like Austria (which did not become a member
of the European Union for many years) or Norway (which has never
23. See Cork Report, supra note 19 at 4, ¶ 16 (describing preliminary EEC Draft as
including: “the rule that a declaration of bankruptcy . . . in one Member State will exclude any
such declaration . . . being subsequently made in any other Member State; the rule that the
liquidator under such bankruptcy orders has powers which extend to all Member States; rules
which in broad terms have the effect that most disputed questions arising in the course of
bankruptcy will be matters for the courts of the State of the bankruptcy and for the law of that
State, even in relation to immoveable property in other Member States, and rules securing the
virtually automatic recognition and enforcement of judgments relating to such questions in
other Member States.”). Moreover, an Annex to the draft contained a proposed Uniform Law
“dealing inter alia with the bankruptcy of persons responsible for the management of firms or
companies, relation-back periods and set-off.” Id. ¶ 9.
24. For extensive discussion of this dissensus, see Noel-Lemontey Report, supra note
15, at 60-61, 73-74, 88-91, 102-03, 106-07, 109-10, 116-17, 124-29; Cork Report supra note
19 at 15-85, ¶¶ 127-28, 140-42, 171, 215-16, 294, 334-37. While there were many differences
in this regard, two were most emphasized: French insolvency law protected the wage claims of
a debtor’s employees even above the priority of the debtor’s other priority creditors; British
administrative receiverships protected a secured creditor’s floating charge to such an extent
that unsecured creditors were often left empty handed in these proceedings.
25. See Cork Report, supra note 19 at 57-67, ¶¶ 244-78.
26. See Balz, supra note 22, at 492, nn.26 & 28 (citing to German practitioners and
academics opposed to the EEC Draft). See also Fletcher, supra note 22, at 437 (1993)
(explaining failure of EEC Draft as due to its “universalist goals which conflicted with
political imperatives”).
27. See Cork Report, supra note 19 at 17, ¶ 75, and at 51, ¶ 221.
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become a full member state). Finally, the EEC Draft was narrowly
focused only on court supervised liquidation-type bankruptcy laws.
While it would have covered UK laws governing the winding up of
insolvent companies, it would not have covered UK administrative
receiverships, for example.
It is worth emphasizing at this juncture, however, that the British
government was inclined to support the EEC Draft. British support
for universality in cross-border recognition of bankruptcy proceedings
was nothing new,28 and some might say had been “invented” in 1817
by English courts with the decision in Odwin v. Forbes.29 But British
universalism was less universal than the European universalism
proposed in the EEC Draft. Cross-border coordination by British
courts was not consistently practiced and was more likely to be
recognized within the British Empire but not more globally or even
necessarily across the Channel.30 Indeed, when British diplomats
travelled to the Hague Conference on Private International Law in
1925 to debate a similar bankruptcy convention31 they walked out
mid-way through negotiations because they viewed the 1925 draft
convention as too universal in scope.32
British support for the principles of universalism and unity set
out in the EEC Draft is perhaps best explained as political and
pragmatic, rather than the inevitable product of its commitment to
universality in bankruptcy practice. 33 As one member of the House of
28. See generally Susan Block-Lieb, Turnaround: Reflections on the Present Day
Influence of Negotiations on International Bankruptcy at the Fifth Session of the Hague
Conference on Private International Law in 1925, 9 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 1
(2014); see also Lipstein supra note 12, at 553-653.
29. See generally Odwin v. Forbes, 1 Buck. 57 (P.C.) (1817) (decision by Jabez Henry).
See also JABEZ HENRY, THE JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF DEMARARA, IN THE CASE OF
ODWIN V. FORBES, ON THE PLEA OF THE ENGLISH CERTIFICATE OF BANKRUPTCY IN BAR, IN A
FOREIGN JURISDICTION, TO THE SUIT OF A FOREIGN CREDITOR AS CONFIRMED IN APPEAL,
WITH THE AUTHORITIES, AND FOREIGN AND ENGLISH CASES (London 1823). For more
modern discussions of this case, see IAN F. FLETCHER, INSOLVENCY IN PRIVATE
INTERNATIONAL LAW, ch. 1 (2d ed. 2005); David Graham, Discovering Jabez Henry: CrossBorder Insolvency Law in the Nineteenth Century, 10 INT’L INSOLV. REV. 153 (2001).
30. See Leonard Hoffman, Cross-Border Insolvency: A British Perspective, 64
FORDHAM L. REV. 2507, 2510-12 (1995-1996).
31. See Noel-Lemontey Report, supra note 15, at 38-40 (comparing 1970 EEC Draft to
bankruptcy convention debated at 1925 Hague Conference on Private International Law).
32. See Block-Lieb, supra note 28.
33. See Cork Report, supra note 19 at 104, ¶ 421 (as the Advisory Committee remarked
in their Cork Report: “[a]lthough the Convention is unsatisfactory in certain respects, the
alternative of excluding its effect may be even more so. As the law now is, a creditor often has
no effective remedies at all in trying to recover a debt from a foreign bankruptcy. The present
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Lords put it when asked to comment on the Cork Report, the Draft
had “received the general support” of a wide range of British experts
who were of the opinion “that this convention is too valuable to throw
away because of its difficulties.”34 Faint praise, with realpolitik in the
driver’s seat. First and foremost, the Labor and Tory governments at
the helm during negotiations on the EEC Draft both viewed
membership in the European Community as critically important to
rebuilding the economy of the United Kingdom, which throughout
this period was in a shambles. Second, there was a feeling that the
Draft Convention was of more importance on the Continent, where a
debtor’s assets might well be situated in multiple countries, but was
likely to “have very little immediate impact” on British insolvency
practice because at least at the time there were very few bankruptcies
concerning assets spread outside the United Kingdom35 Trade crossed
the Channel, but mostly British goods and services sold to
Continental buyers.36 Because the British government viewed crossborder bankruptcy enforcement as a problem more likely to arise on
the Continent, it was willing to live with the EEC Draft, especially
since accession to its terms was part of the overall price of admission
to Europe.
Regardless of its rationale, the willingness of the United
Kingdom to go along with the EEC Draft was, of itself, insufficient.
By 1984, it had been shelved without seeking signatures from
member states.
B. The Istanbul Convention
The failure of the EEC Draft did not end progress within Europe
on agreement on a cross-border insolvency convention. In short order,
negotiations restarted within the Council of Europe (which then

system is so seriously inadequate, that any proposal which seems to offer some kind of
advantage should be carefully examined.”).
34. Remarks of Lord Scarman, ECC 26th Report: Bankruptcy Convention, H.L. Deb,
vol. 424, cc863-78, 4:38 p.m. (Oct. 22, 1981) (referring to Sir Kenneth Cork, “trouble-shooterin-extraordinary,” as well as “Mr. Harper, inspector general of the Insolvency Service in the
Department
of Trade and his
deputy Mr. Armstrong”),
available
at
http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/lords/1981/oct22/ecc-26th-report-bankruptcy-convention.
35. Cork Report, supra note 19 at 643, ¶ 411.
36. A similar argument was made in 1924 to advocate British involvement in the
negotiations on a bankruptcy treaty at the Hague Conference on Private International Law. See
Block-Lieb, supra note 28, at 6.
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included twenty member states)37 on another European convention to
coordinate insolvency practices.38 These negotiations completed
quickly, within five short years. Despite this quick progress much
changed in Europe, and with the European Communities, during these
negotiations. Greece, Spain and Portugal joined the ECs in the 1980s.
Although formation of the European Union and its enlargement to
include its current 28 member states post-dated these negotiations,39
the fall of the Berlin Wall, the unraveling of communism in Eastern
Europe and eventually the dissolution of the Soviet Union occurred as
the finishing touches were being made on the Council’s draft
bankruptcy convention.
Insolvency law reform was also sweeping Europe over this same
period.40 The United States largely rewrote its federal bankruptcy
laws in 1979,41 in turn prompting reform proposals within the United
Kingdom,42 Germany43 and elsewhere in Europe at around the same
37. The Council of Europe was created in the wake of World War II, initially with the
goal of reconstructing and reorganizing Europe’s economies but soon became involved in
many important aspects of international law, most notably in human rights. See BIRTE
WASSENBERG, HISTORY OF THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE 15 (2013). The Council of Europe is
currently comprised of forty-seven countries of Europe, twenty-eight of which are members of
the European Union. Id. at 16. While similar in name, the European Council is distinct from
the Council of Europe, as the European Council sets the European Union’s policy agenda. See
In focus, THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/european-council/
(last visited Aug. 8, 2017).
38. These efforts culminated in the European Convention on Certain International
Aspects of Bankruptcy (commonly referred to as the “Istanbul Convention”). See Balz, supra
note 22, at 492-94
39. The European Union was not established until the Maastricht Treaty entered into
force in 1993. For the complete text of the Treaty on European Union, see Council of the
European Communities and Commission of the European Communities, Treaty on European
Union (1992), available at https://europa.eu/european-union/sites/europaeu/files/docs/body/
treaty_on_european_union_en.pdf.
40. Reform of corporate insolvency laws in the United Kingdom and Germany had
begun before the political upheavals in Eastern Europe could have been anticipated, but the
unification of West and East Germany gave additional impetus for reform of German
insolvency law and, in particular, for political pressure for that law to enable and possibly
favor corporate reorganization. The preference for adopting insolvency laws favoring
corporate reorganization would take on speed, first, as Eastern European countries looked to
privatize their economies after the fall of the Soviet Union and, again, as Europe prepared to
react preventatively to the Asian Financial Crisis. See generally Susan Block-Lieb & Terence
C. Halliday, Settling and Concordance: Two Cases in Global Commercial Law in
TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDERS, at ch. 3 (Terence C. Halliday & Gregory Shaffer eds.,
2015).
41. US Bankruptcy Code, effective Oct. 28, 1979; replacing Bankruptcy Act of 1898.
42. Sir Kenneth Cork’s work to review the EEC Draft for the British government
prompted him to recommend that England and Wales attempt reform of their domestic
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time.44 Each of these reforms looked to revise laws that last had been
enacted in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Corporate
insolvency reform initiatives involved more than simply updating
longstanding statutory provisions, however. With enactment of
chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code, US corporate insolvency law
enabled and indeed favored the rehabilitation of financially ailing
businesses. European reforms also looked to facilitate reorganization
of companies in financial distress. The obvious implication of this
reform raised questions as to whether the Istanbul Convention should
enable coordination of corporation reorganizations and not just
coordination of company liquidation proceedings, even though some
of these reorganization proceedings might easily be characterized as
pre-insolvency proceedings.
The Council draft, completed and opened for signature in
Istanbul by 1990 (and so usually is referred to as the “Istanbul
Convention”), differed substantially from the EEC Draft. The Istanbul
Convention sought neither universality nor unity in insolvency
practice. Rather than provide for European-wide recognition of
insolvency proceedings opened in a member state, it would only have
recognized the standing of the liquidator appointed in a “main”
insolvency proceeding (that is, a proceeding pending in the member
state in which the debtor’s center of interests was located) to take
action elsewhere in Europe. 45 Because it mostly limited the standing
bankruptcy and insolvency laws, which had last been revised in 1914. See, e.g., Remarks of
Lord Scarman, supra note 34; BRUCE G. CARRUTHERS & TERENCE C. HALLIDAY, RESCUING
BUSINESS: THE MAKING OF CORPORATE BANKRUPTCY LAW IN ENGLAND AND THE UNITED
STATES 113 (1998). Cork’s recommendations on English and Welsh insolvency laws
culminated in enactment of the Insolvency Act of 1986. Perhaps ironically, although Cork’s
recommendations on the EEC Draft did not result in coordination of insolvency proceedings
within Europe, he strongly recommended that British reform efforts promote coordination
among insolvency courts throughout the Commonwealth, resulting in enactment of section 426
of the Insolvency Act of 1986. For more detailed discussion of the coordination of
Commonwealth insolvency proceedings under this British law, see generally Hamish
Anderson, Corporate Insolvency After the Insolvency Act 1986, 20 BRACTON L.J. 49 (1988).
43. The new German Insolvenzordnung replaced the Konkorzordnung of 1877.
Although the Insolvenzordnung was enacted by the Bundestag in 1994 and went into effect in
1999, twenty years of discussion, hearings and negotiations had preceded these legislative
events. See Balz, supra note 22 at 487, n.6.
44. See generally Catherine Bridge, European Bank for Reconstruction and
Development, Insolvency – a Second Chance? Why Modern Insolvency Laws Seek to Promote
Business Rescue, LAW IN TRANSITION 28 (2013), www.ebrd.com/documents/legalreform/insolvency-a-second-chance-.pdf.
45. A “foreign main liquidator” could seek and would be entitled to receive protective
measures outside of the debtor’s center of main interests, but these protections were likely to
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of a “foreign main liquidator” to that authorized under “local” law,
and explicitly permitted the opening of multiple secondary
proceedings wherever the debtor held substantial assets, the Istanbul
Convention would have provided “local” creditors with multiple
options for getting paid first out of “local” assets. Moreover, the
Istanbul Convention did not propose a procedure for resolution of
disputes between national courts, for example as to whether the
debtor’s center of main interests existed in one or another member
state, both because it contained only indirect jurisdictional
commitments,46 and did not provide for the possibility of resolution of
such disputes (or any other interpretive issues) in the European Court
of Justice.
Only seven countries signed the Istanbul Convention and it
failed to enter into force.47 It was not signed by the United Kingdom.
This was hardly surprising. Because the Istanbul Convention
envisioned the opening of multiple territorially limited liquidation
proceedings, and coordinated these only through recognition of the
standing of the liquidator in the “main” insolvency proceeding
elsewhere in Europe, and only then by mostly requiring the “main”
liquidator to satisfy the requirements of local law, it would have
accomplished little in the way of coordination. As a result, many
argued that the draft was inconsistent with the development of a
unified European market.48

be limited to the sorts of protections otherwise available in that distant member state; relief in
excess of that, such as the remittance of assets to the state in which the main proceeding was
pending, might have been available, but only after permitting local creditors two months for
bringing collection actions against such assets. See European Convention on Certain
International Aspects of Bankruptcy, E.T.S. 136, art. 11 (1990).
46. Although the Istanbul Convention did not provide for direct agreement on the
jurisdiction of any member state to open insolvency proceedings, it did speak indirectly on the
subject of jurisdiction by limiting automatic recognition to a liquidator appointed in an
insolvency proceeding commenced where the debtor’s center of main interest is located. See
European Convention on Certain International Aspects of Bankruptcy, E.T.S. 136, art. 4
(1990).
47. The Istanbul Convention was signed by Belgium, Cyprus, France, Greece, Italy,
Luxembourg and Turkey, with only Cyprus ratifying this treaty. See BOB WESSELS ET AL.,
INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION IN BANKRUPTCY AND INSOLVENCY MATTERS 87, n.77
(2009).
48. For example, one commentator describes the Istanbul Convention as flawed
because it would have created a series of sub-estates rather than a single universal proceeding
and because it would have provided for discriminatory treatment of foreign creditors. See
Fletcher, supra note 22, at 314-37.
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This territorial “light touch” on coordination of European
insolvency proceedings might have been prompted by more than
simply a reaction to broad dissatisfaction with the utopian goals
sought to be furthered through the EEC Draft. Faced with an
expanding list of member states and possible future member states
whose interests would need to be satisfied with the draft that resulted
in the Istanbul Convention, negotiators may well have understood
their project in terms of a need for caution, an emphasis on
pragmatism over up-to-the-minute reform.
At the same time, the Istanbul Draft suffered from the same
timidity as the EEC Draft: it, too, excluded certain regulated
industries from its scope; it did not address the problem of insolvent
corporate groups or of the assets of a debtor situated in some “third
country;” it looked only to coordinate liquidation proceedings,49
although corporate reorganization was now possible under the UK
Insolvency Act of 1986 and would soon become possible under
German legislation that would, by 1994, be enacted as the new
Insolvenzordnung.
C. The (Third Draft) European Convention on Insolvency
Proceedings
A much-altered draft European insolvency convention began to
emerge in the early 1990s. This third draft convention would not have
provided Europe the unity and universalism envisioned by the EEC
Draft, but would have provided far more universality than the Istanbul
Convention. Like the Istanbul Draft, the third draft would have
provided for the possibility of a main insolvency proceeding and, in
theory at least, multiple secondary proceedings. Like the Istanbul
Convention, a foreign main liquidator’s standing would have been
recognized throughout Europe. But, unlike the Istanbul Convention,
this third draft convention also established jurisdictional rules for the
49. Even without this limited reference to the coordination of liquidation proceedings,
the Istanbul Convention would have made corporate reorganization nearly impossible.
Whenever a debtor’s assets spanned borders within Europe, the Istanbul Convention would
have allowed creditors located outside the debtor’s center of main interests to grab assets; this
protection of local creditors’ interests would have made rescue of a financially troubled
corporation virtually impossible. Uncertainty over which member state had primary
jurisdiction because the Convention left the definition of a debtor’s center of main interests
undefined meant that the prospect of territorial disputes over assets was even more likely to
render reorganization impossible and potentially even upend all efficiency gains from
coordination. See Balz, supra note 22, at 493-94.
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opening of insolvency proceedings within Europe and provided for
European-wide automatic recognition of the opening of main
proceedings (in the member state in which the debtor’s center of main
interests was located) and secondary proceedings (in a member state
in which the debtor ran an establishment), and the enforcement of
judgments entered in such proceedings; unlike the Istanbul
Convention, the third draft also created uniform conflict of law rules
governing in insolvency proceedings, as well as certain guarantees for
creditors’ rights to information about, and to lodge claims in, the
proceedings.
By late 1995, the draft convention was opened for signature and
twelve countries quickly signed. The format of the third draft
convention required member states to accede to its terms within six
months of its opening,50 but Great Britain lagged behind given its
internal need for a report on the draft from a select committee of the
House of Lords.51 The select committee of the House of Lords
appointed to consider and comment on Community proposals
(Subcommittee E) collected testimony and reported on the draft
convention in March 1996.
Although the Hoffman Report did not oppose accession to the
draft convention on insolvency proceedings, neither did it offer a
ringing endorsement of the draft. Thirty years of work resulting in a
final draft convention “is a major achievement for the [European]
Community,” remarked the Report, but “[a]ny sense of relief should
not, however, get in the way of an object and critical appraisal of the
proposal before any decision on participation in the Convention is
taken.”52 The Select Committee was quick to emphasize “major
advantages” in the draft Convention: automatic recognition of UK
insolvency proceedings and judgments entered in those proceedings,53
as well as a clear “duty of cooperation between liquidators” and the

50. That is, by May of 1996. The select committee of the House of Lords on European
Community Proposals, Subcommittee E, collected testimony and issued its report on the third
draft convention in March 1996, three months before the deadline set in the convention.
European Community Proposals Select Committee, Subcommittee E, 1996 HL, at 1, ¶¶ 3-4 (L
Hoffman, Chairman) [hereinafter Hoffman Report].
51. Id.
52. Id. at 15, ¶ 35.
53. Id. ¶ 36. See also id. at 8, ¶ 15 (referring to testimony that this was “the prize” of
the Convention).
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right of all creditors to take part in both main and secondary
proceedings within Europe.54
The Hoffman Report also raised substantive concerns, however,
many of which were similar to those raised in the Cork Report as to
the EEC Draft: The Select Committee was concerned about the
implications of the Convention “for rescue proceedings,” noting in
particular that administrative receiverships were not recognized as a
collective insolvency proceeding within the scope of the draft
Convention but that, in its favor, “the floating charge under which
receivers are ordinarily appointed by parties appear to be recognized
under the Convention as conferring a right in rem” and that “the
administrative procedure and company and individual voluntary
arrangements” would be recognized.55 It also critiqued the limited
scope of the Convention, which excluded credit institutions, insurance
companies and certain investment undertakings,56 that the draft
Convention would have only “intra-Community effect,”57 and that it
would only apply to debtor corporations operating within Europe as
an establishment which is a branch of the parent company but had “no
special rules for dealing with the insolvency of groups.”58 The Report
criticized the lack of definition of the Convention’s primary
jurisdictional test (the “centre of main interests” or COMI test), and
added that the “principal disadvantage” of these jurisdictional tests
“was that of the potential loss of jurisdiction [for British courts],
[jurisdiction] which is currently exercisable where the debtor has
assets in the United Kingdom” but neither a center of main interests
or even an establishment.59 The Report also highlighted three
objections to the terms of the Convention that had been raised in
testimony before it from banks and other financial interests, who
complained about the Convention’s treatment of floating charges,
contractual netting and set-off rights, and other protections, which
54. Id. at 15, ¶ 36.
55. Id. ¶ 37.
56. Id. at 7, ¶ 10 (although also noting that “there are currently two proposals before the
Council for Directive relating to the winding up of banks and other credit institutions and of
insurance companies”), and 15, ¶ 38.
57. Id. at 13 (“in the sense that the centre of the debtor’s main interests in in a Member
State, and only as between Member States”).
58. Id. at 15, ¶ 38 (although noting that “there may still be an advantage where the
Convention assists a United Kingdom parent company in protecting its interest as a
shareholder in a company the subject of main proceedings in another Member State”).
59. Id. at 9, ¶ 19.
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financial markets possessed under then-current British insolvency
laws and but that might have been lost under the draft Convention.60
Still, the Hoffman Report raised a shorter list of complaints
about the third draft Convention than had been raised about the EEC
Draft.61 What most seemed to irk the Select Committee was the fact
that an explanatory report on the draft Convention, which had been
commissioned by the Presidency of the European Union, was
unfinished by the time of the writing of the Hoffman Report and
unlikely to be completed by the time six-month window for accession
to the draft was closing.62 Although the Select Committee states
clearly in its report that “[t]he text [of the Convention] is now fixed,”
meaning “that it is not open to us to devise or speculate on changes”
to its terms, nonetheless the Report noted that several of the
substantive concerns raised by them might have been resolved by
clarifying language in the as-of-then unfinished explanatory report.63
The Select Committee would have preferred to know that the
explanatory report had reflected its concerns before making its
recommendation to Parliament, but that was impossible. This
“procedural” concern seems the most likely explanation for the failure
of the Select Committee to recommend agreement to the terms of the
third draft Convention.
In the end, the Hoffman Report concludes only that “the
proposed Convention on Insolvency Proceedings raises important
questions,” but not that the British government should sign the
Convention. Indeed, the Report remarks that:
[t]he Committee believes that all States are entitled to know, with
a reasonable degree of certainty, to what it is they are being
asked to sign their names. The six months provided by the
Convention would normally be long enough. But the present
position is different, in that the Explanatory Report, which would
offer a way to remove much uncertainty, has yet to be finalized.64

60. Id. at 16, ¶ 39.
61. The Hoffman Report is only a few short pages long, while the Cork Report
comprised hundreds of pages of analysis, much of it critical. In the end, however, the Cork
Report recommended British accession to the EEC Draft mostly on pragmatic grounds. See
generally Hoffman Report, supra note 52; Cork Report, supra note 20.
62. This explanatory report was subsequently completed. See Etienne Schmit & Miguel
Virgos, Report on the Convention of Insolvency Proceedings, DRS 8 (CFC) (May 3, 1996).
63. Hoffman Report, supra note 50 at 15, ¶ 35.
64. Id. at 16, ¶ 41.
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This language might easily be ignored as demonstrating no more than
the preferences of the select committee for dotting i-s and crossing t-s
in the preparation of international legislation. Except that the
penultimate paragraph of the Hoffman Report also invites
reexamination of the transnational politics of the European Union.65
Ultimately, the United Kingdom used its position as the last nation to
sign on to the draft Convention as a point of leverage.
That the United Kingdom ultimately refused to sign the draft
Convention on Insolvency Proceedings is well known. Although
ostensibly declining to sign onto the draft Convention in protest over
prohibitions on trade in British beef due to fears of mad cow disease,
its refusal might instead have involved an unrelated ongoing dispute
concerning the “Gibraltar situation.”66
Closer examination of the record shows that the Hoffman Report
itself seems to invite the inaction ultimately taken by the British
government:
If the deadline in the present text passes, that would not prevent
the Convention coming into being at a later date. It would hardly
be in the interest of Member States who support the Convention
to sacrifice it altogether rather than accept some delay. The
Government should not sign the Convention in advance of their
being satisfied, following consultation and consideration, that
technical uncertainties have been removed.67

Prime Minister John Major referred only to British trade interests in
declining to sign the third draft convention but Lord Hoffman’s
political assessment that the convention might not be lost if left
unsigned referred more to the Select Committee’s peak over the
failure of the European Presidency to complete the explanatory report
on time rather than over British beef.

65. Id.
66. GABRIEL MOSS, IAN FLETCHER, AND STUART ISSACS, MOSS, FLETCHER AND
ISAACS ON THE EU REGULATION ON INSOLVENCY PROCEEDINGS (3d ed. 2016); BOB
WESSELS, EUROPEAN UNION REGULATION ON INSOLVENCY PROCEEDINGS: AN
INTRODUCTORY ANALYSIS, at ¶¶1.2-1.3 (3d ed. 2007). Gibraltar is a British Overseas
Territory located on the southern end of the Iberian Peninsula. The Spanish Crown formally
ceded the Gibraltar in perpetuity to the British Crown in 1713. Spain later attempted multiple
times to recapture the territory. In 1966, the Spanish Government formally proposed to achieve
the return of Gibraltar to Spain. The proposal was rejected by the British Government and by
the Gibraltarians, which overwhelmingly voted to remain under British sovereignty in a
referendum held in 1967.
67. See Hoffman Report, supra note 50 at 16, ¶ 41.
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Regardless of the precise motivation of the British government
in failing to accede to draft EU Convention, the United Kingdom
failed to sign on and as a result the third draft EU Convention also
failed to enter into force.
D. The (Original) EU Regulation on Cross-Border Insolvency
The Select Committee had been right about Europe’s
unwillingness to throw away a perfectly good draft convention even
though it had failed to enter into effect on the basis of the UK failure
to join. Undeterred by the failure of the third draft convention to enter
into force, Germany and Finland quickly redrafted it to conform to the
requirements of a regulation under European law.68 This “new” EU
Regulation on Insolvency Proceedings differed from the third draft
EU Convention on the same subject mostly in form; on the substance,
it was nearly identical to the draft Convention in nearly every detail.69
Within a short time, [15] Member States had agreed to be bound to
the terms of the EU Insolvency Reg, including Great Britain. By
2002, the EU Reg entered into force, governing cross-border
insolvency practice within the European Union.
Like the third draft Convention on the same topic, the EU
Insolvency Reg provides for automatic recognition of and
coordination among insolvency proceedings pending in EU Member
States. In addition, it includes rules governing the jurisdiction of
contracting Member States’ courts’ to open insolvency proceedings,
and the effect of insolvency proceedings once commenced. Thus,
with its 55 articles, 6 chapters and 3 annexes, the EU Reg included (i)
rules of jurisdiction, (ii) rules on the law applicable to insolvency
proceedings and the disputes arising in those proceedings, as well as
(iii) rules governing the recognition and enforcement of orders
entered in such proceedings. While several of the Recitals preceding
the Regulation differ from similar language in the draft Convention,
the EU Reg is virtually indistinguishable to the substance of the third
draft convention.

68. Initiative of the Federal Republic of Germany and the Republic of Finland with a
view to the adoption of a Council Regulation on insolvency proceedings, Procedure
1999/0806/CNS (May 26, 1999).
69. The original EU Insolvency Regulation was meant to be (and was) substantively
identical to earlier draft EU Convention. See KLAUS PANNEN (ED.), EUROPEAN INSOLVENCY
REGULATION, INTRODUCTION, at 11 (2007).
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In small ways, however, the third draft Insolvency Convention
and original EU Insolvency Reg differ, and many of these differences
track substantive concerns that had been raised in the Hoffman Report
on the Convention.70 When the EU Reg was first published but not
yet binding on the UK, the Select Committee of the House of Lords
made sure that these concerns had been resolved in the EU Insolvency
Reg consistent with what it understood to be British interests.71
Despite these small changes, the British government did not
succeed in redressing other issues that had been raised in the Hoffman
Report. The EU Reg is not an explicitly corporate-reorganizationfriendly document. It refers to insolvency proceedings as
administered by liquidators. It permits the filing, and the recognition
and enforcement, of both a “main” proceeding in a debtor’s COMI
but also “secondary” proceedings potentially wherever a debtor is
established. Like the preceding third draft Convention, the original
EU Reg does not explicitly define what constitutes a debtor’s “centre
of main interests” (its COMI).72 On its face, it only applies to a single
corporate actor and, thus, does not resolve the issue of corporate
groups. The United Kingdom signed the EU Insolvnency Reg, and the
Reg entered into effect on May 2002.

70. These differences are all found in the Recitals to the EU Reg. Balz, supra note 22.
Since recitals were not a part of the format of a convention, new points could have been added
without opening up the articles themselves for revision.
71. See House of Lords, Select Committee on European Communities, Letter from Lord
Tordoff, Chairman of the Committee, to Dr. Kim Howells MP, Parliamentary Under-Secretary
of State for Consumer and Corporate Affairs, Department of Trade and Industry (Nov. 4,
1999), available at https://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld199900/ldselect/ldeucom/21/
2129.htm [hereinafter “Tordoff Letter”]. In the Tordoff Letter, the Chair of the Select
Committee asked: (i) whether various “technical points (concerning floating charges, netting
agreements and settlement arrangement in financial markets)” had been expressly resolved in
either the recitals or provisions of the EU Reg; (ii) whether the question of the applicability of
the EU Reg to Gibraltar had been resolved; (iii) whether the Parliamentary Under-Secretary
could comment on “the ability of the United Kingdom to enter into agreements (Treaties,
Conventions, etc.) with Third States on insolvency matters”; (iv) whether Ireland and Denmark
would be parties to the EU Reg; and (v) whether the Government could share with the Select
Committee what it had learned about practitioners’ reactions to the EU Reg. An exchange of
correspondence results in Lord Tordoff’s satisfaction. See id.
72. COMI is not defined in the EU Reg, but Art. 3(1) presumes that a corporate
debtor’s COMI exists at the place of its registered office (that is, its place of incorporation);
see also EU Reg, supra note 1, Preamble ¶ 13.
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E. British Influence on the EU Regulation on Cross-Border
Insolvency
Spanning nearly forty years and producing three draft
conventions before settling on a European-wide regulation, these
negotiations more reflect political compromise than coalescence
around a singular jurisprudential vision for a unified market approach
to the problem. Although negotiations on the EU Insolvency Reg
have conventionally been understood as involving compromise
between common law and civil law approaches to insolvency
practices, the preceding analysis also shows that these negotiations
involved compromise of British interests. The British government did
not succeed in resolving in diplomatic negotiations criticisms of the
EU Reg, which had been raised in testimony and reports within the
British government.
This analysis surprisingly reveals that the Cork and Hoffman
Reports criticized the European proposals on coordinating crossborder insolvency proceedings on very similar grounds, although
these reports addressed distinctly different draft conventions. Despite
these criticisms, the British government agreed to be bound to the EU
Insolvency Reg. Its last-minute political pretexts for objecting to the
third draft Insolvency Convention had almost caused forty years of
work to get wasted. The British government achieved small victories
in the conversion of the third draft Convention to a regulation, but not
more.73
Given that the text of the original EU Insolvency Reg was the
product of compromise, its meaning was in important ways left for
courts to interpret. It is to this judicial record that Part II next turns.

73. See generally Tardoff Letter, supra note 71. I leave for another day the effects of
the EU Reg, and particularly critiques of the EU Reg, on domestic insolvency legislation
within the United Kingdom, but note briefly that the Cork Report suggested that all UK
insolvency law should be reviewed, subsequently resulting in enactment of the 1986
Insolvency Act; that based on his involvement in review of the EEC Draft, Sir Cork was clear
that modern insolvency law should enable the rescue of a failing corporation rather than
simply its liquidation and also that this law should provide statutory grounds for recognition of
insolvency proceedings outside the United Kingdom but inside the former Commonwealth
countries, resulting in section 426 of the 1986 Insolvency Act. The remedy of administrative
receivership fell into disuse also perhaps as a result of the EU Reg’s failure to include that
proceeding within its scope, and ultimately was repealed in the 2002 Enterprise Act.
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III. BRITISH IMPLEMENTATION OF THE EU INSOLVENCY
REGULATION
Although British influences on the original EU Insolvency Reg
were undeniably important in the drafting of this text, British
diplomats did not dominate negotiations on European cross-border
insolvency coordination—appropriately so, since European Union
requires European consensus. Nonetheless, British actors did have
enormous impact after the original Regulation went into effect.
To a large degree, this impact was the consequence of the unique
attributes of British courts. By 2002, when the original EU Insolvency
Reg first entered into effect, British courts already had long
experience in coordinating foreign insolvency practice given British
imperial history. British courts’ early nineteenth century instincts
toward universal recognition of foreign insolvency proceedings would
certainly have extended to proceedings arising within the British
Empire.74 The Insolvency Act of 1914 governed insolvency
proceedings arising anywhere in the Empire. This “Imperial
universalism” continued after the fall of British Empire after WWII
and was mostly re-codified in the Insolvency Act of 1986.75
This influence was also the consequence of how British courts
historically had interacted with the insolvency practitioners that
effectively ran companies once a company accessed an insolvency
proceeding. In the context of administrative receiverships, receivers
were allowed broad discretion to resolve a floating charge after an
event of default.76 British administrators and liquidators also
exercised a great deal of discretion under the supervision of British
courts.77
Finally, this influence was also the consequence of the state of
British insolvency law in 2002. The Insolvency Act of 1986 had
substantially reformed British insolvency law. It included a statutory
direction for British courts to cooperate with insolvency courts in a
74. See e.g., Stewart v. Auld, (1851) 13 D. 1337 (recognizing an insolvency proceeding
initiated in Australia); see also Hoffmann, supra note 30, at 2510; Hoffman Report, supra note
50, at 8-10.
75. See Insolvency Act of 1986, section 426 (UK), available at http://www.legislation.
gov.uk/ukpga/1986/45/section/426.
76. See ROY GOODE, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE INSOLVENCY LAW 346-52 (4th ed.
2011); See also Hoffman, supra note 30, at 2507-08; Hoffman Report, supra note 50, at 15, ¶
37.
77. See GOODE, supra note 76, at 150-56 (liquidators’ powers) & 447-66
(administrators’ powers).
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broad range of former-Commonwealth countries. More importantly, it
sought to create a culture of “corporate rescue” under British law.
Although the administration procedure adopted under the Act was
viewed by many to be too rigid to fully implement the goals of
corporate rehabilitation, it was revised with enactment of the
Enterprise Act 2002, streamlining the administration proceedings first
adopted in 1986 but also effectively abolishing the administrative
receivership.78 Although the Enterprise Act did not become the law
until late 2003, and did not apply to floating charges created before
application of the Enterprise Act, by 2002, when the EU Insolvency
Reg entered into effect, British insolvency law was nonetheless
viewed as far more reorganization-friendly than French or even
German law on the topic.79 This perception was not limited to those
from the United Kingdom. Continental bankers and manufacturers
and service providers also shared this opinion and a few Continental
companies demonstrated this preference by changing their executive
offices or otherwise configuring their place of registration so that they
could be reorganized under British law rather than some other
Continental insolvency law.
A. COMI and the Possibility That Presumptions Get Rebutted
Both the Cork Report on the EEC Draft and the Hoffman Report
on the third EU draft convention had criticized predecessors to the EU
Insolvency Reg for applying to a single debtor corporation and its
branch establishments across Europe, even though market practices
commonly provided for pan-European businesses to be run through a
group of corporations, many of them registered under distinct
European corporate laws.80 Undoubtedly aware of this criticism,
British insolvency practitioners did not feel limited by it. Instead they
78. See id. at 385-86; See, e.g., John Armour, Audrey Hsu and Adrian Walters, The
Impact of the Enterprise Act 2002 on Realisations and Costs in Corporate Rescue Proceedings
(Dec. 2006)(reporting to the UK insolvency service), https://www.researchgate.net/publication
/242155506.
79. Although in 1994 the German Bundestag substantially revised their insolvency laws
to adopt a “unitary” system that would have enabled corporate rescue and reorganization, Balz
supra note 22 at 492 n.23, this reform legislation was viewed as less reorganization friendly
than UK insolvency laws at that time. See generally Müge Adalet McGowan and Dan
Andrews, Insolvency Regimes and Productivity Growth: A Framework For Analysis, OECD
Economics Department Working Papers No. 1309 (July 1, 2016), available at
https://www.oecd.org/eco/insolvency-regimes-and-productivity-growth-a-framework-foranalysis.pdf.
80. See supra Part I.C.
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pushed, almost from the moment the EU Reg entered into effect, for a
construction of the articles of the Regulation to resolve these
complaints. In doing so, these insolvency practitioners were simply
viewing the open-ended standards embedded in the EU Reg as
opportunities for argument rather than as sources of uncertainty,
which is to say that they were engaged in the sort of inventive
advocacy that the common law invited.
The first such case, In re BRAC Rent-A-Car International, Inc.,
did not involve a pan European group of corporations, but instead a
company incorporated under US law – Delaware law, to be precise.81
An administration order against BRAC was entered by the High Court
in London, although the debtor was a Delaware corporation. Italian
judgment creditors objected. Although before the EU Reg entered into
effect in May 2002 the Insolvency Act of 1986 would not have
countenanced the filing of the Delaware corporation, Mr. Justice
Lloyd found that under Art. 3 of the EU Reg it had jurisdiction
because the company’s “centre of main interests” were in England
and not the United States:
The Company is incorporated in Delaware, and has its registered
address in the United States. However, that is not an address
from which it trades, and it has never traded in the US. Its
operations are conducted almost entirely in the United Kingdom.
82

The court, thus, held that the EU Reg extended its jurisdiction beyond
that previously available under the Insolvency Act of 1986 by virtue
of Art. 3’s sole jurisdictional focus on whether the “centre of the
debtor’s main interests is within that Member State, as is the case in
this instance.”83
But while the most controversial aspects of this case were the
extra-territorial extension of the EU Reg outside Europe to apply to a
company that had been incorporated in a “third country” – the United
States, BRAC Rent-A-Car also demonstrated the route through which
the EU Reg might cover an entire group of corporations within
Europe. This “route” was evident from the facts of the case. For not
only did the High Court of London find that the Delaware corporation
81. In re BRAC Rent-A-Car Int’l Inc. [2003] EWHC (Ch) 128 (7 Feb 2003). For the
full text of this unpublished opinion, see https://www.iiiglobal.org/sites/default/files/
media/Re_Brac_Rent_a_Car.pdf.
82. Id. ¶ 4. For further description of the “Englishness” of the debtor, see id. ¶ 5.
83. Id. ¶ 31.
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conducted its operations “almost entirely in the UK,” it also
mentioned that these operations extended throughout Europe and
elsewhere through a group of corporations. In describing BRAC RentA-Car International, Inc., it noted that:
[The Company] was until recently part of the Budget group, and
its business is that of managing the European, Middle Eastern
and African operations formerly carried on by that group. It has
subsidiaries in many Western European countries, each of which
has, in turn, agreements with various franchisees. In countries
where the company does not have a subsidiary it enters into
franchise agreements directly with franchisees.84

BRAC Rent-A-Car involved not just a Delaware corporation whose
“centre of main interests” was in England. It was also a parent of a
corporate group whose “centre of main interests” was in England.
Following in the wake of BRAC Rent-A-Car, British barristers
argued before British courts that the Regulation’s presumption that a
corporate subsidiary’s COMI was located in its place of registration
should be rebutted in favor of a finding that the subsidiary’s COMI
was identical to that of its parent corporation, an English company
whose head office and management and books and records were also
located in England.85 For example, three months after BRAC Rent-ACar, the Leeds High Court upheld petitions for administration orders
submitted on behalf of a pan-European group of insolvent companies
in In re Daisytek-ISA Ltd.86 The petitions involved not only the
English parent company, which was itself a subsidiary of an
American corporation, but also several subsidiaries of that English
company, one registered in France and two in Germany.87 The Leeds
court concluded that it had jurisdiction to enter administration orders
involving the French and German subsidiaries so long as their “centre
of main interests” were in England under Art 3(1) of the EU Reg,88
and found that the “centre of main interests” of the subsidiaries was in
84. Id. ¶ 4.
85. For a case holding that Art. 3 of the EU Insolvency Reg enabled the London High
Court of Justice to assert jurisdiction over an administration order sought by an unregistered
company which could be wound up under the Insolvency Act of 1986, see In re The Salvage
Association [2003] EWHC 1028 (Ch), Case No. 2664 of 2003 (May 2003).
86. In re Daisytek-ISA Ltd & Others [2003] B.C.C. 562 (16 May 2003). For extensive
discussion of Daisytek, see Samuel Bufford, International Insolvency Case Venue In The
European Union: The Parmalat And Daisytek Controversies, 12 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 429
(2006).
87. Daisytek, supra note 86, ¶ 2.
88. Id.. ¶ 12.
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Bradford, England.89 Specifically, the court found that ISA
International plc performed the “head office” functions for the
corporate group. It “has negotiated supply contracts with major
suppliers,” and “given guarantees to major suppliers” and other trade
creditors.90 And because the “centre of main interests” of the French
and German subsidiaries were in Bradford, England, the
administration orders were entitled to automatic recognition across
Europe under Art 16 of the EU Insolvency Reg.
There was one practical difficulty with such an argument, and
that is that the English administrators in Daisytek found that they
needed to convince the creditors and courts in France that the COMI
of the French subsidiary was England not France. This construction
of the EU Insolvency Reg was not immediately convincing to the
Pontoise District Commercial Court.91 The District Commercial Court
opened a main insolvency proceeding in France for the French
subsidiary in the Daisytek corporate group, although a main
proceeding governing the French subsidiary had already been opened
in Leeds, England.92 This was exactly the sort of result that the EU
Insolvency Reg sought to prevent, but the French court viewed the
English decision “as tantamount to a denial of the concept of
corporate legal personality” on the grounds that “the concept of a
group does not have any legal implications and each of the companies
in the group has separate legal personality.”93 On appeal, the cour
d’appel in Versailles reversed, however, concluding that the High
Court of Justice in Leeds, England had sufficient jurisdiction to open
insolvency proceedings concerning the French subsidiary based on
that court’s finding that the French subsidiary’s “centre of main
interests” was situated in England and not in France, its place of
registration.94
89. Id. ¶ 3 (holding that “the evidence shows that the trading companies in the group
are managed to a large extent from Bradford and that they are managed and controlled as a
group so that the activities of the group companies throughout Europe are coordinated by the
head office in Bradford”).
90. Id. ¶ 4.
91. See Klempka v. ISA Daisytek SA, 2003 WL 22936778, Cour’ d’appel
[CA][regional court of appeal] Versailles, civ. (Sept. 4, 2003).
92. Id. at 111.
93. Id. at 114.
94. See Bufford, supra note 86, at 462 (concluding that the Versailles cour d’appel
“found that the Leeds court had validly opened a main proceeding for Daisytek-France, and
that, pursuant to the provisions of the EU Regulation, no French court had jurisdiction to open
a subsequent main proceeding for the company, and that the decision of the Pontoise
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The support of the Versailles cour d’apel in ISA Daisytek SAS
ensured that British courts’ treatment of pan-European corporate
groups would, if the evidence supported it, continue to involve
findings that companies not registered under any UK law were
nonetheless within the jurisdiction of British courts because their
“centre of main interests” was situated in the United Kingdom.95 This
result tentatively allowed corporate groups to reorganize under the
gaze of the EU Insolvency Reg, particularly if members of a corporate
group all filed in the United Kingdom on the basis of their COMI in
common.
Insolvency practitioners and commentators were not perfectly
comfortable with this state of the law. Premising jurisdiction on a race
to the courthouse places emphasis on the fleet-footedness of a
company’s professionals, as well as on statutory hurdles preventing
the commencement of an insolvency proceeding in some countries.
For example, Italian lawyers and Italian courts learned when they lost
their arguments that the COMI of a member of the Parmalat corporate
group should be viewed as Italian despite its Irish registered office.96
In In re Eurofood, the European Court of Justice upheld the Irish
Supreme Court’s refusal to rebut the presumption that an Irish
subsidiary’s COMI was situated in Ireland, its place of registration,
and not Italy, the location of the Irish subsidiary’s corporate group
parent, on a variety of grounds including the perceptions of third party
creditors of the Irish financing subsidiary.97
The focus in this article is on British influences on European law
governing cross-border insolvency proceedings, and so I mention
Eurofood only for its influence within the United Kingdom. Although
the facts of Eurofood were distinct from those in ISA Daisytek SAS,
aspects of this decision might have cautioned British barristers against
making assurances that the European Court of Justice would see it
their way in some subsequent case. Fortunately, British courts’
corporate-group-reorganizing construction of the COMI standard was
tested again, after the ECJ’s decision in Eurofood, providing some
comfort to British insolvency practitioners. In MG Rover, British
Commercial Court to open a main insolvency proceeding for Daisytek-France violated the EU
Regulation”).
95. Klempka supra note 91 at 112. See also Ci4NET.COM, Inc., [2004] EWHC 1941
(Ch), Nos 556 and 557 of 2004 (May 20, 2004)(involving a Delaware corporation and Jersey
registered corporation).
96. See, e.g., Case C-341/04, Eurofood IFSC Ltd., 2006 E.C.R. I-03813.
97. See id.
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courts opened an administration proceeding involving the Rover
corporate group on the basis of a COMI-in-common among the
British corporate parent and French and German subsidiaries.98
Although French creditors again objected to the rebuttal of the French
subsidiary’s place of registration as an indication of its COMI, this
time the French Commercial Court declined to open a second “main”
proceeding relating to the French subsidiary in the Rover group and
the Versailles cour d’appel upheld this declination as a proper reading
of the EU Insolvency Reg post- Eurofood.99
B. Protecting Local Creditors Without Opening Secondary
Proceedings?
Both the Cork and Hoffman Reports also criticized the earlier
draft conventions on which the EU Insolvency Reg was premised for
focusing on liquidation rather than rescue of companies in financial
distress.100 To some degree, the complaint had been addressed by
express inclusion of British administration proceedings and voluntary
arrangements within the scope of the original EU Insolvency Reg.101
But the universalism that had been embraced in the EEC Draft and
that was the approach to cross-border insolvency treatment most
likely to facilitate corporate rescue was rejected in favor of the socalled “modified” universalism by the third draft Convention and later
the EU Reg.102 Commentators fretted, in particular, that the possibility
that numerous secondary proceedings could be opened under the
terms of the EU Reg would undermine corporate reorganization in
Europe.103
98. MG Rover [2005] EWHC 874 (Ch.)
99. Public Prosecutor v. Segard (as Administrator for Rover France SAS), Cour d’apel
[CA] Versailles, civ., 2006.
100. See supra Part I.C.
101. See EU Reg, supra note 1, Annex A.
102. See, e.g., Jay L. Westbrook, Multinational Enterprises in General Default:
Chapter 15, The ALI Principles, and The EU Insolvency Regulation, 76 AM. BANKR. L.J. 1
(2002).
103. See, e.g., GOODE, supra note 76. Goode puts the problem in this way:
Creditors have a particular incentive to pursue secondary proceedings
where the lex concursus governing their claims gives them better rights
than they would enjoy under the law governing the main proceedings. For
example, French law givens employees greater rights than English law on
the insolvency of the employer, so that where main proceedings are opened
in England against a French company, then in terms of the range of claims
ranking for preferential status employees of the company will fare better in
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Again, these concerns did not limit British insolvency
practitioners when implementing the EU Insolvency Reg after its
effective date. In one case, In re Collins & Aikman Europe SA, the
British parent had sought and obtained an administration order and
had joined in its request several of its subsidiaries, incorporated
across several different European jurisdictions, all on the basis of
their British COMIs.104 Once in administration, the joint
administrators faced irate creditors in the member states in which
some of the subsidiaries where located.105 These creditors argued
informally, and probably rightly, that regardless of the Britishness of
the subsidiaries’ COMIs, which could not at that juncture have been
relitigated, some of the non-British incorporated subsidiaries had
establishments outside the United Kingdom and inside Europe, and
these establishments alone justified the commencement of secondary
proceedings.106 Because the opening of secondary proceedings would
have, as a practical matter, so delayed the reorganization of the
corporate group as to thwart its rescue, the joint administrators made
“oral assurances” at local creditors’ committee meetings “that if there
were no secondary proceedings in the relevant jurisdiction then their
respective financial positions as creditors under the relevant local law
would as far as possible be respected in the English
administration.”107 These assurances did the trick. Secondary
proceedings were not opened and the European body of creditors of
the corporate group supported the joint administrators’ proposed
reorganization plan.108
After the fact, the joint administrators sought judicial ratification
of what they had informally promised, but the authority of the British
court to enforce by the joint administrators’ oral promises was
unclear. The EU Insolvency Reg specifies that the insolvency law of
the main proceeding (that is the High Court of London and so English
insolvency law) generally should govern distributions from a
secondary proceedings in France than they would in main proceedings in
England. Id. at 749.
104. In re Collins & Aikman Europe SA, et al. 2006 EWHC 1343 (Ch.). In making
seeking administration orders for the European wing of the Collins & Aikman corporate group,
the debtors were simply following in the footsteps of BRAC Rent-A-Car, Daisytek and Rover.
See supra Part II.A.
105. See generally In re Collins, supra note 104.
106. See Id. ¶ 8.
107. Id.
108. Id.
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proceeding under its scope rather than the insolvency law of the
location of local creditors, at least where local creditors have not
opened secondary proceedings in the member states in which the
debtor had an establishment. But the joint administrators had assured
the local creditors that they would receive no less from the Collins &
Aikman estate than what they would have been entitled to under their
local insolvency law. In the end, the British court ratified the joint
administrators’ assurances on the ground that the English statute
governing administrations grants administrators broad discretion in
their roles, and that other rules of common law supported ratification
of the assurances made on the grounds that breach of these would be
dishonorable.
That enforcement of the joint administrators’ assurances was
necessary to accomplish reorganization of the corporate group in
Collins & Aikman infuses the decision of the British court. But the
EU Insolvency Reg was not premised on the desirability of promoting
the rescue of a corporation (or corporate group) in financial distress.
Indeed, its unfriendliness to corporate rescue culture was a complaint
that had been registered when reviewing the desirability of acceding
to the terms of the EU Reg (and to the third draft EU Insolvency
Convention that preceded it). In reaching this conclusion, however,
the British court found jurisdiction to ratify insolvency practices that,
while not expressly prohibited by the EU Reg, were also only
tenuously supported by it. Because the British court found it had
discretion to ratify the assurances as a matter of English law, the court
was not contravening the text of the EU Insolvency Reg. But because
the court’s ratification of the joint administrators’ assurances was a
matter of its judicial discretion, British insolvency practitioners could
not be sure that the same result would follow in later cases.109
IV. REVISING THE EU INSOLVENCY REG, WHILE MOVING
TOWARD CONVERGENCE
The original EU Insolvency Reg was drafted predominately to
reflect laws focused more on the liquidation than the reorganization of
corporate debtors, on debtor-corporations structured as singular
109. For discussion of the Collins & Aikman approach to secondary proceedings, see
John A.E. Pottow, A New Role for Secondary Proceedings in International Bankruptcy 46
TEX. INT’L L. J. 579 (2011); Edward J. Janger, Silos: Establishing the Distributional Baseline
in Cross-Border Bankruptcies, 9 BROOKLYN J. COM. & FIN. L. 180 (2014).
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entities rather than groups of corporations, and on the opening of local
proceedings to allow for the protection of local creditors’ claims to
assets situated outside a debtor’s “centre of main interests.” These
shortfalls were apparent to the British government as it engaged in
negotiations on each of the draft conventions preceding
implementation of the EU Reg, but in weighing the costs against the
benefits the decision was made to overlook these details in favor of
the big picture: entry into a common European market.
As with any legal document produced to achieve consensus
among the interests of numerous national interests, the story of the
drafting and production of the EU Insolvency Reg is only part of the
story. All laws settle into practices, and often shift in their accepted
meaning as later implemented and enforced.110 This EU Reg is no
exception in this regard, which evolved both as practitioners and
courts learned to work under within its express language and, over
more than a dozen years, were required by one of its provisions to
study past practices and consider revisions to this text.
Thus, although the original EU Insolvency Reg was drafted with
the roughly equal involvement of the European member states in
1999, much of this settlement and resettlement occurred with British
involvement at its core. Notwithstanding what many had perceived as
limitations in the text of the EU Reg, over a dozen years, pragmatic
British insolvency practitioners appearing before pragmatic British
courts interpreted and implemented the EU Reg as a document
enabling the rescue and reorganization of global corporate groups in
financial distress. The story of the influence of the United Kingdom
on cross-border insolvency practice within Europe is, in large part,
then, a court-centered story that illustrates the importance of
pragmatism, persistence and patience in the long-term project that is
the implementation of the European Union. Over time, a corporategroup-reorganization-friendly vision of the EU Insolvency Reg took
hold, especially within the United Kingdom. Because this vision was
more a function of British courts’ implementation of the EU Reg than
the express language of its text, however, this settled practice might
well have been unsettled.
British actors were intently focused on solidifying the results
they had received before British courts. Importantly, buried at the end
110. See generally Susan Block-Lieb & Terence C. Halliday, Settling and
Concordance: Two Case Studies in Global Commercial Law, in TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL
ORDERS 75 (Terrence C. Halliday & Gregory Shaffer, eds., 2015).
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of the original EU Insolvency Reg was a boilerplate provision, Art.
46, which provided that:
[n]o later than 1 June 2012, and every five years thereafter, the
Commission shall present to the European Parliament, the
Council and the Economic and Social Committee a report on the
application of this Regulation. The report shall be accompanied if
need be by a proposal for adaptation of this Regulation.111

It was well understood that a report on practices that had developed
under the EU Insolvency Reg could prompt European-wide buy-in on
the results in British case law like BRAC Rent-A-Car, Daisytek,
Rover, and Collins & Aikman. More importantly, revision of the text
of the EU Reg could codify aspects of these judicial practices so that
they would be more perfectly reflected “on the books” throughout
Europe. But would the European Union follow where it had been led?
By 2012, when by its terms the original EU Insolvency Reg was
set for review and revision, much had changed within Europe.
Beginning in 2008, a global financial crisis had threatened the
economies of not only the United States but also Europe and even the
BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa). The United
States rescued, through corporate chapter 11 reorganizations
proceedings, two economically important automotive manufacturers,
Chrysler and General Motors, and cobbled together repairs of its
financial markets, providing a combination of tough regulatory love
and TARP funding. By 2012, however, Europe’s financial crisis had
grown to encompass sovereign debt problems, first in Iceland, then
Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Spain, Cyprus, Hungary, Romania and
elsewhere. Some of these sovereign debt problems were resolved with
infusions of financial assistance from the IMF, European Central
Bank and European Commission (together referred to as the Troika),
but some European countries’ debt problems remain even today.
Thus, the European Commission began its work on reporting on
possible revisions to the EU Insolvency Reg “[a]t a time where the
European Union [was] facing the biggest economic crisis in its
history.”112
By 2015, the European Parliament and Council of the European
Union were convinced to promulgate an amended version of the EU
111. EU Insolvency Reg, supra note 1, art. 46.
112. European Commission, Commission Staff Working Document Impact
Assessment: Revision of Regulation (EC) No. 1346/2000 on insolvency proceedings
(Strasbourg Dec. 2012).
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Insolvency Reg, and by late 2016 the European Commission had
promulgated a proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament
and of the Council aimed at harmonizing corporate insolvency law
within Europe. The European Parliament adopted the revised EU
Insolvency Reg in May 2015, thirteen months before a British
referendum would call for the United Kingdom to exit from the
European Union. The Commission finalized the proposed EU
Directive in November 2016, five months after the Brexit referendum.
A. [Revised] EU Regulation 2015/848 on insolvency proceedings
Unlike the original EU Insolvency Reg, the revised version is far
more reorganization friendly. Some of this reorganization friendliness
is expressed indirectly, through definitions. References which under
the original EU Reg were to the “liquidator” are replaced with
references to the more neutral “insolvency practitioner.” The
possibility of a debtor in possession is also recognized. The revised
EU Insolvency Reg continues to divide insolvency proceedings into
main proceedings in the debtor’s COMI and secondary proceedings
where the debtor has establishments, but now both terms are
explicitly defined.113 Moreover, the definition of COMI in the revised
Insolvency Reg is identical to that applied by British (as well as most
other European) courts. Judgments opening insolvency proceedings
are entitled to automatic recognition, as had been true under the
original EU Insolvency Reg, but now the revised version specifies
that these effects “may not be challenged in other Member States.”114
Although the revision continues to permit the opening of
secondary proceedings,115 it also provides the insolvency practitioner
in the main proceedings has the “right” to give an undertaking to
avoid the opening of secondaries.116 This undertaking resembles the
practices ratified in Collins & Aikman,117 but the revised EU
Insolvency Reg also goes on to specify that any “court seised of a
request to open secondary insolvency proceedings shall immediately
give notice to the insolvency practitioner or the debtor in possession
113. See revised EU Insolvency Reg., supra note 6, art. 3(1) (defining COMI as “the
place where the debtor conducts the administration of its interests on a regular basis and which
is ascertainable by third parties”).
114. Id. art. 20(2).
115. Id. art. 34.
116. Id. art. 36.
117. Id.
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in the main insolvency proceeding” so that the insolvency practitioner
or DIP is given “an opportunity to be heard on the request” and
presumably obtain an undertaking obviating such opening.118 To
provide clarity on the priority of the preference set by actors in the
main proceeding, the revised Insolvency Reg specifies that the giving
of an undertaking is itself entitled to recognition of sorts; the court in
the would-be secondary proceeding may “not open secondary
insolvency proceedings if it is satisfied that the undertaking
adequately protects the general interests of local creditors.”119 And,
whether or not an undertaking is posted, the revised EU Insolvency
Reg requires a court that opens secondary proceedings to “stay the
process of realization of assets in whole or in part on receipt of a
request from the insolvency practitioner in the main insolvency
proceedings.”120 The insolvency practitioner is also explicitly
empowered to propose a restructuring plan that would bind
participants in any secondary proceeding, so long as the restructuring
is permissible in all affected jurisdictions.121
The revised EU Insolvency Reg also addresses the question of
corporate groups.122 Unlike British practices, which largely leave
much to the discretion of a joint administrator in a corporate group
with member companies with COMIs situated in England, the revised
EU Insolvency Reg specifies in great detail the circumstances under
which insolvency proceedings of members of a group of companies
should be coordinated.123
B. Proposed EU Directive on preventative restructuring frameworks
Shortly after finalizing the revised EU Insolvency Reg, the
European Commission also promulgated a draft Directive that looks
to promote greater convergence in European insolvency and debt
118. Id. art. 38(1).
119. Id. art. 38(2).
120. Id. art. 46(1).
121. Id. art. 47(1). In this regard, the proposed EU Restructuring Directive is
undoubtedly intended to prompt member states to adopt domestic legislation authorizing
restructuring of this sort, so that participants in secondary proceedings would be so bound. See
Directive 2016/723, of the European Parliament and of the Council on Preventive
Restructuring Frameworks, Second Chance and Measures to Increase the Efficiency of
Restructuring, Insolvency and Discharge Procedures and Amending Directive 2012/30/EU,
2016 O.J. L 141/19 [hereinafter “EU Restructuring Directive”].
122. See revised EU Insolvency Reg., supra note 6, ch. V, arts. 56-77.
123. See id.
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restructuring laws, and specifically convergence around a culture of
corporate rescue.124 Although Continental insolvency laws in
existence at the time the original Insolvency Regulation was
promulgated mostly favored liquidation of insolvent businesses, the
new Restructuring Directive proposes that member states adopt
national legislation enabling and perhaps preferring the reorganization
of viable businesses facing economic difficulty. Because both detailed
and, as of yet, unfinished, I leave for another day description of the
Restructuring Directive. Suffice to say for purposes of this article that,
if finalized and implemented, the Restructuring Directive would result
in the eventual convergence of European insolvency and preinsolvency laws so that they favored a rescue culture and were more
in line with current UK (and also US) laws on the reorganization and
restructuring of distressed companies.125
V. THE EFFECTS OF BREXIT ON EUROPEAN INSOLVENCY
PRACTICES
All of this raises the question of: What next? What will crossborder insolvency law look like after the United Kingdom leaves the
European Union?
Currently, the United Kingdom and all other EU countries
except Demark are parties to the revised EU Regulation on
Insolvency Proceedings, which came into effect in late June 2017.
The proposed Directive on Preventive Restructuring Frameworks also
became final in late November 2016, although by its terms does not
require member states to adopt legislation to implement its terms until
two years after the Directive enters into force.
Since Prime Minister Theresa May recently initiated Brexit
negotiations under Art. 50, it is reasonably certain that the United
Kingdom will leave the European Union within the next two years, 126
124. See EU Restructuring Directive, supra note 121.
125. See id. See also text associated with supra notes 75-79 (discussing move toward
corporate rescue culture in previous ten to twenty years).
126. It is less clear whether the United Kingdom will also leave or re-join the European
Economic Area (EEA). If it re-joins the EEA, then the Directive on Preventive Restructuring
Frameworks would govern. Directives apply within the EEA, even to countries that are not
members of the European Union (such as Norway, Liechtenstein and Iceland), but Regulations
and Conventions do not. See, e.g., Moss, supra note 66. See also David Menzies, ICAS
Director of Insolvency, Brexit: Implications for insolvency and restructuring, ICAS (Jun. 27
2016),
https://www.icas.com/technical-resources/brexit-implications-for-insolvency-andrestructuring (“Whilst it is possible that either the Norwegian or Swiss models could be used
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which would mean that, eventually,127 EU law would not govern
recognition of insolvency proceedings commenced in the United
Kingdom or British courts’ recognition of insolvency proceedings
commenced in Europe.128 Some other law might get negotiated or
otherwise put in place as a substitute. But what would that law look
like? How effective would it be?
There is discussion of a Great Repeal Bill, which promises to
domesticate EU law as the law of the United Kingdom.129 Many think
that the effect of the Great Repeal Bill would mean that the UK is
bound, at least initially upon Brexit and the simultaneous enactment
of the Repeal Bill, by the EU law to which the United Kingdom was
bound on the day before Brexit.130 But although it is also possible
that the Great Repeal Bill could succeed in binding the United
Kingdom to EU law as a matter of British law, it would not bind the
members of the European Union to reciprocate.131 After all, the Great
Repeal Bill would only be a matter of domestic UK law.
It might also be possible for the United Kingdom to negotiate a
treaty with the member states of the European Union that provides for
continuation of something closely resembling to the revised EU

going forward, it is considered by most commentators that the United Kingdom will negotiate
its own exit agreement with the European Union.”).
127. I say “eventually” because, presumably, proceedings started under EU law would
continue to be governed by EU law even after exiting the European Union.
128. See, e.g., Brexit: What does it mean for restructuring and insolvency?,
FRESHFIELDS BRUCKHAUS DERINGER (July 1, 2016), http://knowledge.freshfields.com/
m/Global/r/1574/brexit__what_does_it_mean_for_restructuring_and_insolvency_
(“Unless
replacement legislation is given effect before Brexit, we expect that there will no longer be
automatic recognition of UK insolvency proceedings in other EU member states.”).
129. See generally Parliament, House of Lords, Select Committee on the Constitution,
The “Great Repeal Bill” and delegated powers, 9th Report, HL Paper 123 (March 7, 2017),
available at https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201617/ldselect/ldconst/123/12302.htm
[hereinafter HL Report on Great Repeal].
130. UK Government, White Paper, The United Kingdom’s exit from and new
partnership with the European Union, at 10 (describing effects of proposed “Great Repeal Bill”
as “preserv[ing] EU law where it stands at the moment before we leave the EU”).
131. See HL Report on Great Repeal, supra note 129. Thus, as far as cross-border
recognition of insolvency proceedings, the effects of the Great Repeal Bill may not differ
much from that of existing British law pertaining to the recognition of non-European
insolvency proceedings – namely, the 2006 Insolvency Regulation implementing
UNCITRAL’s Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency. Section 426 of the 1986 Insolvency
Act may provide for greater cross-border coordination, but mostly as applies to former
Commonwealth countries.
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Regulation on Insolvency Proceedings.132 The Council of Europe,
whose membership is not limited to the EU member states, would be
an obvious source for such a treaty.133 So might UNCITRAL, the
Hague Conference on Private International Law (“HCCH”), or the
International Institute for the Unification of Private Law
(“UNIDROIT”).134
A treaty of this sort would be consistent with British interests.
Regardless of what one thinks about the original EU Reg, the United
Kingdom played a significant role in crafting the revised EU Reg and
the United Kingdom should want to remain bound to its terms. Given
that negotiations on the revised EU Reg and on the Directive of
Preventive Restructuring Frameworks are so recently resolved, it
would be reasonable to presume that the other 26 members of the
European Union should also want the United Kingdom to remain
bound to the revised Regulation and the new Directive.135
But this common-sense conclusion will be difficult to
implement. The history of the making of the original EU Insolvency
Reg suggests that negotiations on such a treaty could take some time
–hopefully not another forty years!
Although the content of this new treaty would look to parallel
that of the recast EU Insolvency Reg, which has already been written,
and although there was a quick turnaround time between failure of the
third draft EU Convention on Insolvency Proceedings and the original
EU Insolvency Reg, there are several new problems, all of which will
be difficult to resolve.
132. See id. And depending on whether the United Kingdom also leaves the EEA, to
negotiate a treaty through which the European Union and United Kingdom agree to be bound
by the Directive on Preventive Restructuring Frameworks. Id.
133. For discussion of the Council of Europe, see Wassenberg, supra note 37.
134. For information on the HCCH, see Hague Conference on Private International
Law, The World Organization for Cross Border Co-operation on Civil and Commercial
Matters, HCCH, https://www.hcch.net/en/home (last visited Aug. 8, 2017). For information
about UNIDROIT, see History and Overview, INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR THE
UNIFICATION OF PRIVATE LAW (last updated May 18, 2016), http://www.unidroit.org/aboutunidroit/overview. See also Susan Block-Lieb & Terence Halliday, Contracts and Private Law
in the Emerging Ecology of International Lawmaking, in CONTRACTING BEYOND BORDERS:
THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL MARKETS IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY, (Gregoire Mallard and
Jerome Sgard eds. 2016)(discussing emergence and work of HCCH and UNIDROIT as
compared to that of UNICTRAL).
135. Personal Correspondence with Gabriel Moss (on file with the editors of the
Fordham International Law Journal) (“The common-sense of all this seems to be that the UK
and the 27 (or at least the 26, excluding Denmark), should reproduce the Recast Regulation by
Treaty.”).
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First, enforcement of the EU Insolvency Regulation depends on
each member state accepting the jurisdiction of the European Union
Court of Justice. But it is not at all clear that this sort of enforcement
provision can be negotiated as a part of any newly negotiated treaty
between the United Kingdom and European Union on the recognition
of insolvency proceedings. For some time now, Prime Minister
Theresa May has said that she would not accept the jurisdiction of the
EU’s Court of Justice and it is difficult to see how the revised EU
Insolvency Reg can work without enforcement.136 Currently, there is
no alternative transnational court to delegate enforcement authority to
in the same way as there are possible alternative lawmaking IOs for
treaty drafting.137 But the question of the UK’s continuing submission
to the jurisdiction of the CJEU after Brexit, even temporarily, is not
an issue unique to the question of cross-border insolvency
recognition, which could mean that the solution for recognition of
insolvency proceedings takes on greater importance in diplomatic
negotiations than one might think. Just this month, important
progress has been made on this issue, with the UK Government
putting forward a White Paper on various proposals for enforcement
and dispute resolution after Brexit.138 Given the newness of this
proposal, there can be no certainty that it would meet with the
approval of EU diplomats or that any tentative agreement reached on
this issue would continue to exit by the time set for Brexit under Art.
50. Nonetheless, the new White Paper’s appearance presents an
important shift in the tone of the negotiations so far.
That said, insolvency practitioners should not pop champagne
corks just yet. Nearly since the Brexit referendum was first reported,
there existed the substantial worry that the political situation within
Europe would favor second-best solutions in Brexit negotiations with
the United Kingdom so as to signal to other member states that
exiting the European Union comes with substantial costs. It might be
136. Id.
137. It might be possible to negotiate a treaty between the United Kingdom and
European Union that does not accept the jurisdiction of the CJEU to resolve conflicts raised by
national courts’ interpretation of this treat, but that creates the possibility of conflicts between
this new treaty and existing EU agreements in the recast EU Reg, which after all would
continue in effect after Brexit among the remaining EU member states. This potential for
conflict would be difficult to tolerate, long term.
138. See UK Government, Enforcement and dispute resolution: A Future Partnership
Paper, available at https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data
/file/639609/Enforcement_and_dispute_resolution.pdf.
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perfectly consistent with the national interests of all concerned to
negotiate a treaty on recognition of insolvency proceedings that
closely resembles existing European law, but this issue is just a pin
prick in the sea of substantive issues that will need to get resolved
between UK and EU diplomats. So far, signals regarding the order in
which things get decided do not suggest that the issues on which
agreement ought to be relatively easy will get decided first. To the
contrary, the easy issues may get decided last.
In the absence of a newly negotiated treaty on cross-border
insolvency, domestic UK law would govern, but could not provide
resolution equivalent to that under the EU Reg.139 Whether by means
of the Great Repeal Bill, or existing UK law providing for recognition
of “foreign” insolvency proceedings, British courts could coordinate
with and assist incoming cases – that is, insolvency proceedings
commenced in Europe and seeking recognition from British courts –
but these laws would not provide assurance of coordination on
outgoing cases that have been commenced in British courts and that
seek recognition and enforcement across Europe.140 Even in those EU
member states that have enacted legislation to implement
UNICTRAL’s Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency, and there are
only several of these countries, recognition would not be automatic
and assured in the same way as under the EU Reg. Moreover, British
law limits the effect of their Model-Law implementing legislation (the
2006 Insolvency Regulation) so that it has no implication for the
recognition and enforcement of insolvency related judgments.141
UNICTRAL has been at work in patching this hole for several years
139. See, e.g., Graham Bushby & Ian G. Williams, Inside the “Brexit Bubble”: What’s
Next for the UK?, XXXV, No. 9 A.B.I. JOURNAL (Sept. 2016)(“The ECReg gives automatic
recognition to UK insolvency proceedings throughout the EU, and without access to it,
reliance will have to be placed on each member state’s own laws, as was the case in the
past.”). See also What will be the Impact of Brexit on Insolvency Proceedings?, LEXOLOGY
(Oct. 5 2016), http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=7828bfb8-feaf-4a7e-97cbcc5664f36e47; Brexit: Restructuring and Insolvency, HERBERT SMITH FREEHILLS, (Feb. 16,
2017), available at https://www.herbertsmithfreehills.com/latest-thinking/brexit-restructuringand-insolvency.
140. See Brexit: initial considerations in the restructuring and insolvency market (July
2016), CLIFFORD CHANCE, available for download at https://financialmarketstoolkit.
cliffordchance.com/en/financial-markets-resources/resources-by-type/client-briefings/2016/07/
brexit---initial-considerations-in-the-restructuring-and-insolve.html (noting that, going
forward, “any reasoned analysis for cross border deals will inevitably depend on the outcome
of the exit negotiations, which may be swayed by matters wholly unrelated to insolvency”).
141. Rubin v. Eurofinance S.A.; New Cap Reinsurance Corp. v. Grant [2012] UKSC
46; [2013] 1 AC 236.
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and seems poised to promulgate a new Model Law on the
Recognition and Enforcement of Insolvency-Related Judgments,142
but enactment of legislation to implement one or both of these
UNCITRAL Model Laws across Europe cannot be guaranteed and, in
any event, also could take a substantial period of time.
VI. CONCLUSION
The negotiation that produced the EU Regulation on Insolvency
Proceedings, which entered into force in 2002, was time-consuming
(spanning nearly forty years) and complicated (involving three earlier
draft conventions). Although commentators generally view British
influence on the original EU Reg as important, my review of reports
to the House of Lords and Parliament more emphasize flaws than lay
out grounds for British support. Despite these early reservations, the
United Kingdom joined in the EU Insolvency Reg. Later, British
insolvency practitioners sought to construe the EU Reg in ways
inconsistent with concerns that had been raised before its entry into
force and thus convinced British courts to solve the problem
diplomats failed to fix. Based at least in part on this experience,
European (including British) diplomats mostly codified British
practices in their recent agreement to revise the EU Reg. Ironically,
after Brexit, Europe will be left with a recast EU Reg that is heavily
influenced by British insolvency practices and a new EU Directive
that is heavily influenced by British law. While post-Brexit the United
Kingdom may succeed in continuing to be bound by the EU Directive
on Restructuring Frameworks, it faces substantial impediments to any
replication of the EU Reg, mostly because this Reg is reciprocal and
is subject to enforcement by the European Union Court of Justice.
There is a serious risk that the United Kingdom will lose the
benefits of the revised EU Insolvency Regulation. Let’s hope that this
risk gets resolved, and diplomats instead succeed in negotiating a
new, similar treaty on cross-border recognition of insolvency
proceedings across the Channel. This resolution would be better for
both the United Kingdom and the European Union.

142. See UNCITRAL Recognition and Enforcement of Insolvency-Related Judgments:
Draft Model Law (Mar. 1, 2017), available at https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/
LTD/V17/013/46/PDF/V1701346.pdf?OpenElement.

